State Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands Located Within Reservation Boundaries: Reconsidering County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation and Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County by Taylor, Scott A.
American Indian Law Review
Volume 23 | Number 1
1-1-1998
State Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands
Located Within Reservation Boundaries:
Reconsidering County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation and
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass
County
Scott A. Taylor
University of St. Thomas School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott A. Taylor, State Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands Located Within Reservation Boundaries: Reconsidering County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation and Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 23 Am. Indian L.
Rev. 55 (1998),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss1/3
STATE PROPERTY TAXATION OF TRIBAL FEE
LANDS LOCATED WITHIN RESERVATION
BOUNDARIES: RECONSIDERING COUNTY OF
YAKIMA V. CONFEDERATED TRIBES & BANDS OF
THE YAKIMA INDIAN NATION AND LEECH LAKE
BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS V. CASS COUNTY
Scott A. Taylor*
Although once the owners' of the North American continent, native peoples
and the governments that represent them now own only a small percentage of
the land within the current United States.2 Many tribes are interested in
reacquiring lands that once belonged to them.3 Tribes, as governments and as
legal entities, have the power to acquire lands through purchase.4 When tribes
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. J.D., 1978, University of
New Mexico; LL.M. (tax), 1982, New York University.
1. Anglo-American law has long acknowledged native ownership of the land notwithstanding
the view that the discovery doctrine vested title of North American lands in the crown of the
European country whose subjects were the first Europeans to lay claim to the lands. See, e.g.,
John P. Lowndes, When History Outweighs Law: Extinguishment of Abenaki Aboriginal Title, 42
BUFF. L. REv. 77, 96 (1994) (discussing examples of judicial misapplication of the discovery
doctrine). The European discovery doctrine merely gave each European nation, as against other
European nations, the exclusive right to acquire native title through purchase or conquest.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543-44 (1832). As Justice Marshall explained in
Worcester, the discovery doctrine
gave to the nation making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole
right of acquiring the soil and of making settlements on it. It was an exclusive
principle which shut out the right of competition among those who had agreed to
it; not one which could annul the previous rights of those who had not agreed to
it. It regulated the right given by discovery among the European discoverers; but
could not affect the rights of those already in possession, either as aboriginal
occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the memory of
man. It gave the exclusive right of purchase, but did not found that right on a
denial of the right of the possessor to sell.
Id. at 544.
2. Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Annual Report of Indian Lands, Form 5-
5425 (1996) (reporting tribal ownership of lands at 45.3 million acres and individual native
ownership at 10.1 million acres).
3. See, e.g., Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 108 F.3d 820 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 361 (1997) (tribe repurchased parcels lost through the allotment
process).
4. The primary federal law recognizing tribes as legal entities (that is, governmental legal
entities) is section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act, which provides that any tribe "shall have
the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and
bylaws .... Indian Reorganization Act, § 16, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 987 (1934) (current version
at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1994). No specific federal statute specifically creates or recognizes Indian
tribes as legal entities. Instead, tribes seem to have the status of pre-existing governments that
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buy lands from private owners, the tax status of the lands becomes an
immediate issue. All of the fifty states levy an annual ad valorem real property
tax.5 States, constantly vigilant in protecting their tax revenue, readily attempt
to tax lands newly acquired by tribes Tribes, understandably, are interested in
minimizing the cost of purchasing and holding lands. Moreover, tribes view
state taxation of their lands as an affront to tribal sovereignty. As a result,
conflicts over state taxation inevitably arise.
This article takes the position that tribally owned fee lands located within
Indian country are exempt from state real property taxes because Congress has
passed no law authorizing states to impose such taxes. As a result, the general
rule that states have no power over Indian tribes except as granted by Congress
applies and barg such taxation. The United States Supreme Court, in County of
Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation,7 erroneously concluded that the General
Allotment Act of 1887, as amended by the Burke Act of 1906,' authorized state
taxation of all fee lands whose ownership status derived from the General
Allotment Act. The Supreme Court, in Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians
v. Cass County,"0 is currently considering an extension of the Yakima case to all
tribally owned fee lands whose ownership status derives from specific treaties
or from other federal legislation not explicitly granting congressional
authoriz2tion to states to impose real property taxes.
To demonstrate that tribally owned fee land located within Indian country is
exempt from state property taxation, this author first discusses the current rules
governing state taxation of Indian lands and then turns to a historical overview.
The discussion then looks at the definition of Indian country and the problems
that the often times imprecise definition creates. Within this context, the author
discusses the leading cases dealing with state taxation of Indian lands and
concludes that the Supreme Court should reconsider and correct its decision in
the Yakima case and should decide the pending Leech Lake case in favor of the
tribe.
have the rights of any government, which, presumably, would include the right to purchase and
own property. Congress has provided that tribes cannot sell their lands without congressional
approval. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994) (enacted in 1790 at the request of then President George
Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox, both of whom were owners of large amounts of
western lands and were desirous of protecting their investments by limiting the ability of tribes
to sell their lands directly to other land developers; see discussion infra notes 267-68).
5. See generally ABA PROPERTY TAX DESKBOOK (William B. Prugh ed., 1996-97).
6. See, e.g., Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 108 F.3d 820 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 361 (1997) (Minnesota); United States v. Michigan, 106 F.3d 130
(6th Cir. 1997) (Michigan); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Washington); Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 855 F. Supp. 1194 (D.
Colo. 1994), vacated, 61 F.3d 916 (10th Cir. 1995) (on ripeness grounds) (Colorado).
7. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
8. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
9. Ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182.
10. 103 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 361 (1997).
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L Summary of Current Legal Rules Governing
State Taxation of Indian Lands
As a general rule, states have no power to tax tribes or members of tribes for
activities within Indian country." This immunity from state taxation extends to
state ad valorem real property taxes imposed on tribal lands or lands owned by
members of the tribe. 2 Congress, however, can authorize state taxation of these
lands by enactment of explicit legislation. 3 An example of such congressional
authorization is section 6 of the General Allotment Act of 1887," which
provided that previously tax-exempt Indian-owned lands would become subject
to state taxation after the federal government issued a fee patent to the
individual Indian owner.
In contrast, tribes and members of tribes enjoy no immunity from state
taxation of their lands that are located outside Indian country unless Congress
specifically prohibits state taxation.s This means that the mere ownership of
land by an Indian or a tribe provides no immunity from state taxation of the
land. An example of congressional prohibition of state taxation involves certain
lands held in trust." As part of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Congress
specifically provided that any land acquired by the federal government and held
11. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. CL 2214, 2219 (1995) (citing
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985)).
12. See generally The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866) (reaffirming
immunity of tribal land from state property taxation); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737
(1866) (finding lands allotted to individual Indians immune from state property taxation where
members retained political membership in tribe, where lands remain restricted under a treaty, and
where tribe remained in existence)
13. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 258 (1992).
14. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390, as amended by the Burke Act, ch.
2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906). Section 6 of the General Allotment Act gave states general civil and
criminal jurisdiction over allotted lands. In 1905, the United States Supreme Court interpreted
this language as extinguishing feddral power over allotments at the time granted even though the
period of restriction had not expired. See In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905). Congress passed the
Burke Act in 1905 to reverse the Heff decision and to provide that state federal authority did not
end and state jurisdiction did not commence until the restrictions on the allotted land were lifted.
In the Burke Act, Congress specifically stated that at the end of the period of restriction any
restrictions on state taxation would end. Bure Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. at 182.
15. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973) (imposing New Mexico's
gross receipts tax on tribe that operated a ski resort on land leased from the federal government
and located adjacent to the tribe's reservation); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v.
Yavapai County, 50 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding Arizona's imposition of its ad valorem
real property tax on a cement production facility the tribe owned off its reservation).
16. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994) (providing that lands acquired by the federal government
and placed in trust for the benefit of a tribe or an individual Indian "shall be exempt from State
and local taxation"). This federal bar on state and local taxation applies whether or not this trust
land is located within Indian country.
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in trust for a tribe or a member of tribe is exempt from state taxation even
though the land is located outside of Indian country."
The taxation of non-Indian owned lands located within Indian country is less
clear. For those lands acquired and traceable back to a fee patent issued under
the General Allotment Act of 1887, state taxation is specifically permitted. " For
other lands and interests in real property, state taxation seems to be permissible
unless Congress prohibits it or if the state taxation would be an impermissible
infringement of the tribe's right of self-government. 9
II. Historical Background
A. Treaty Period
Before the American Revolution, the British viewed the Indian tribes as
politically separate entities that were largely self-governing?' Under the Articles
of Confederation, the British view continued,2 but the power of and
responsibility for dealing with Indian tribes was not clearly allocated to the
federal government or among the states." The drafters of the Constitution
attempted to remedy this confusion by making Indian affairs an exclusive
federal concern.' In any case, the view of tribes as separate political entities
was quite clear and well understood by state and federal governmental
officials.'
17. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985 (current version at
25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994).
18. See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390, as amended by the
Burke Act, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182.
19. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (allowing imposition
of state oil and gas severance taxes on wells operated by non-member oil under lease with tribe);
Pimalco, Inc. v. Maricopa County, 937 P.2d 1198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (involving state
possessory interest tax imposed on leasehold interest held by non-member in tribal lands located
within the tribe's reservation).
20. CHARLEs C. RoYCE, INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, EIGHTEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY 549-61 (1899) (noting that British
policy towards tribes as governments became explicit at the beginning of the 18th century).
21. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL
ANOMOLY 41-66 (1994) (describing treaties and their negotiation) thereinafter PRUCHA,
TREATIES].
22. See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REv 1055,
1098-1147 (1995) (providing an insightful legal history of the state/federal conflicts during this
period).
23. Id. at 1147-64 (discussing the federalization of Indian affairs through the adoption and
implementation of the Indian commerce clause.)
24. The negotiation and ratification of treaties would have made the political status of tribes
quite clear. See PRUCHA, TREATIES, supra note 21, at 72 (noting that President Washington
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The connection between political status and taxation was crystal clear to the
Anglo-American colonists and remained clear after these "colonials" became
citizens of the newly formed United States. To the new citizens of the United
States, a political entity could impose taxes only on those individuals who were
members of the political entity, on activities conducted within the entity's
boundaries, or on lands located within the political boundaries.O In the case of
Indians, it was logical that self-governing tribes and their members would not
be subject to state or federal taxation. This made sense because the tribal
member owed political allegiance to the tribe and had no rights as a resident of
a state or as a citizen of the United States.
The United States Constitution is silent about federal or state powers of
taxation of Indian tribes and is also silent about their political status within the
federal system. Nonetheless, the view that tribes were politically separate and
therefore not subject to state or federal taxation was unquestionably clear at the
time of the drafting of the Constitution. In apportioning members of the House
of Representatives among the states based on population, the drafters provided
that "Indians not taxed" would be excluded from the census. 7 At the time,
most of the states did not permit residents to vote unless they owned property
and paid their state property taxes.' Therefore, it made perfect sense that
Indians who remained members of their tribes and who held property not
subject to state taxation should be excluded from the census that allocated
representatives.
Following the formation of the United States, federal Indian policy reflected
the view that tribes were politically separate from the states and from the United
States." The political separation from the United States, however, was not
complete. The United States, in establishing its boundaries with European
countries, acquired territory within which Indian tribes resided." European
25. A principle cause of the Revolutionary War was a dispute over taxes that Parliament
imposed without any colonial representation in that body. See Territory of Alaska v. Troy, 258
U.S. 101, 103 (1922).
26. In most of the original states, voting was restricted to land owners paying taxes.
CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 65-72 (2d ed. 1935) [hereinafter BEARD, ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION] (noting that only
Pennsylvania had voter qualification rules that did not require land ownership and payment of
taxes).
27. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
28. BEARD, ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 26, at 65-72.
29. PRUCHA, TREATIES, supra note 21, at 3-5.
30. The Louisiana Purchase from France in 1803 is a good example. The treaty with France
makes it clear that the boundaries of the United States expanded to include the newly acquired
territory. Even so, the treaty also promises to abide by the terms of any existing treaties that
Spain had with the Indian tribes and nations located within the newly acquired territory. Treaty,
art. VI cite. Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, Apr. 30,
1803, art. 6, 8 Stat. 218, 221, reprinted in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS 507
(1832).
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powers had long used American Indian tribes as pawns in imperial struggles,
and the young United States realized that European powers would continue to
do so in a way contrary to federal interests.3 The United States pursued a
policy of acquiring the political allegiance of tribes and to use this allegiance to
cut the tribes off from foreign influence.32 Through this process, the United
States viewed tribes as owing an exclusive allegiance to the federal government.
The hundreds of federal treaties entered into with the Indian tribes reflect this
relationship. Notwithstanding the federal view that Indian tribes were
"dependent nations" and, therefore perhaps, subject to the federal power to tax,
Congress never attempted, until quite recently, to impose a federal tax on tribes
or their members?3
The landmark United States Supreme Court decision of Worcester v.
Georgid" clearly established that a state has little or no power over an Indian
tribe located within a state's boundaries. In that case, Samuel A. Worcester, a
missionary from Vermont, traveled to the Cherokee Nation in Georgia in order
to preach the gospel?5 Mr. Worcester had secured the necessary federal
permits to enter the territory of the Cherokee Nation and also had permission
from the tribe.' However, he had not secured a permit from Georgia, which
had passed a statute that required a license from the governor before anyone
would he permitted to enter that part of the Cherokee Nation located within
31. The Treaty of Ghent, which concluded the War of 1812, makes clear that tribes were
involved on the side of the British.
The United States of America engages to put an end, immediately after the
ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of
Indians with whom they may be at war at the time of such ratification; and
forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions,
rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one
thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities.
Treaty of Ghent, Dec. 24, 1814, art. 9, 8 Stat. 200, 202, reprinted in 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,
FOREIGN RELATIONS 747 (1832).
32. See, e.g., PRUCHA, TREATIES, supra note 21, at 130.
33. Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871), is something of an exception.
Congress passed an excise tax on tobacco. The tax by its term did not expressly extend to Indian
country. A federal tax official asserted a tobacco tax liability against members of the Cherokee
Nation for tobacco they had grown within the reservation located within the Indian territory. The
United States Supreme Court held that the general federal tax statute superseded a treaty provision
that explicitly granted an exemption from federal taxes. The executive branch later concluded that
the case had no precedential value because only six justices participated in the decision (four of
whom voted in favor of taxation). See Method of Determining "Indians Not Taxed," Op. Solic.
Dep't Interior, No. M-31039 (Nov. 7, 1940) [hereinafter Solicitor's Opinion], reprinted in I U.S.
DEP'T OI INTERIOR, OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1917-1974, at 990 (1979) [hereinafter Op. SOLIC. DEP'T
INTERIOR].
34. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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Georgia?7 For violating this statute, Georgia prosecuted Worcester in a state
court.8 A Georgia jury convicted Worcester of violating the licensing statute,
and the trial court judge sentenced him to four years of hard labor in the state
penitentiary. 9
Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia offers a detailed history
and exposition of the prevailing federal view that tribes were distinct political
entities not subject to state authority." Justice Marshall even went so far as to
conclude that the territory of the Cherokee Nation located within the boundaries
of Georgia was politically outside Georgia.4 '
The Cherokee Nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves or in conformity with the treaties and with the acts of
Congress.42
The general principle in Worcester, although now much eroded by subsequent
acts of Congress and decisions of the Supreme Court, remains viable and served
as a partial basis for the Supreme Court's relatively recent tax decision in
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation.
4 3
That Indian tribes remained exempt from state taxation must have remained
obvious through the 1860s. In 1861 the Confederate States of America adopted
a constitution that provided for popular representation in a house of
representatives." The apportionment clause provided that "Indians not taxed"
would be excluded from the census. In 1867 Congress and the states, to
reflect the elimination of slavery, amended the United States Constitution by
adding the Fourteenth Amendment." In Section 2 of the Fourteenth
37. Id. at 542.
38. Id. at 540.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 542-60.
41. Id. at 561.
42. Id.
43. 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993) (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557, that
Indian tribes are "distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their
authority is exclusive.")
44. CONFEDERATE CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3, reprinted in MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE
CONFEDERATE CONSnTUTION OF 1861, at 136 (1991). The clause provided:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may included within this Confederacy, according to their respective
numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free
persons including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all slaves.
Id.
45. Id.
46. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 593-608 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting and
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Amendment, the Apportionment Clause for representation in the House of
Representatives removed the three-fifths clause for slaves but retained the
"Indians not taxed" rule.47 The "Indians not taxed" language in the Confederate
Constitution and in the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that state and
national leaders continued to view Indian tribes as politically separate outside
of the jurisdiction of states. 4O
The United States Supreme Court confirmed this view in two cases it decided
in 1867; Kansas Indians" and New York Indians. Both cases involved
attempts by states to tax Indian lands under a state ad valorem real property tax.
In both cases, the Supreme Court held that the Indian lands remained beyond
the reach of the state's taxing power so long as Congress took no action to
remove the immunity of the lands from state taxation.
In Kansas Indians, the Supreme Court squarely addressed the power of
Kansas to impose its property tax on lands owned by members of the Shawnee
providing a detailed history of the 14th Amendment).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed.").
48. See Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 33, reprinted in Op. Souc. DEPI INTERIOR, supra
note 33, at 992. The opinion stated:
The exclusion of the Indians from the constituent body, the people, was reflected
too in their exclusion from the operation of both State and Federal tax laws. As
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution these Indians were not subject to
taxation, so too were they not subject to taxation at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This attribute of their status remained the same and it was
retained as descriptive of a status which likewise had remained the same.
d. This view is consistent with the description found in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)
(holding that a Native American born within the United States was not a citizen within the
meaning of the 14th Amendment).
The Indian tribes, being within the territorial limits of the United States, were not,
strictly speaking, foreign States; but they were alien nations, distinct political
communities, with whom the United States might and habitually did deal, as they
thought fit, either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or through
acts of Congress in the ordinary form of legislation. The members of those tribes
owed immediate allegiance to their several tribes, and were not part of the people
of the United States ....
The alien and dependent condition of the members of the Indian tribes could
not be put off at their own will, without the action of assent of the United States.
They were never deemed citizens of the United States, except under explicit
provisions of treaty or statute to that effect, either declaring a certain tribe, or such
members of it as chose to remain behind on the removal of the tribe westward, to
be citizens, or authorizing individuals of particular tribes to become citizens on
application to a court of the United States for naturalization, and satisfactory proof
of litness for civilized life ....
Id. at 99-100.
49. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866).
50. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866)
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Tribe." The Court reiterated the basic principle in Worcester that Indian tribes
are separate and politically distinct entities that are beyond the powers of a
state, including its power to tax.' In Kansas Indians, the county taxing
authority pointed out that the treaty setting aside lands for the members of the
Shawnee Tribe allocated some of the land to them in severalty.' This form of
individual ownership, the county argued, subjected the lands to state taxation 5
The Court, however, rejected this argument, finding instead that so long as the
tribe remained a viable entity the members' land remained immune from state
taxation. The Court further found that Kansas agreed not to tax Indian lands
by operation of its constitution and by a provision in the federal enabling
legislation granting statehood.'
To further ensure the exemption of tribal lands from state taxation, Congress
required the constitutions of newly admitted states to disclaim the power to tax
these lands. 8 The enabling legislation for these states contained a similar
provision 9 These provisions, however, made it clear that Congress could in
the future authorize state taxation of tribal lands or extinguish tribal
ownership,' which would remove the ban on state taxation because the tribe
would no longer be the owner.
In New York Indians,6 the Supreme Court considered New Yorks attempt
to impose its property taxes on reservation lands of the Seneca Nation. Unlike
51. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 751..
52. d. at 755-56.
53. Id. at 756.
54. Id. at 755.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 756..
58. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
59. See, e.g., Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, 558 (enabling act for New
Mexico).
60. See, e.g., id. at 558-59. This provision states:
That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they
forever disclaim all right and title to ... all lands lying within said boundaries
owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes the right or title to which shall have
been acquired through or from the United States or any prior sovereignty, and that
until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same
shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction
and control of the Congress of the United States ... but nothing herein, or in the
ordinance herein provided for, shall preclude the said State from taxing, as other
lands and other property are taxed, any lands and any property outside of an
Indian reservation owned or held by any Indian, save and except such lands as
have been granted or acquired as aforesaid or as may be granted or confirmed to
any Indian or Indians under any Act of Congress, but said ordinance shall provide
that all such lands shall be exempt from taxation by said State so long and to such
extent as Congress has prescribed or may hereafter prescribe.
Id.
61. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866).
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Kansas, which was a new state admitted under condition that it disclaim all
authority over Indian lands, New York was one of the original states62 whose
constitution and terms of admission to the union involved no express waivers
of power over Indian tribes or their lands. New York viewed the issue as one
involving consistency between state law and the underlying federal treaties.'
New York acknowledged that the treaties with the Indians, to the extent they
conflicted with state law, would govern by operation of the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution.' New York, however, asserted that none of
the relevant treaties expressly prohibited New York from taxing Indian lands.'
New York argued that the Indian lands were within the political boundaries of
New York and should be subject to the state's taxing power absent an express
federal prohibition.'
In ruling against New York's power to tax, the Supreme Court interpreted the
treaty terms broadly, finding that the treaty language providing that the tribe
"shall continue in the occupation and enjoyment of the whole of the said two
several tracts of land" was sufficient to bar New York from taxing the lands.'
Prior to the formation of the union, New York and Massachusetts through a
compact settled the competing claims they had over the territory that included
these reservations. The terms of their settlement of the boundary dispute
indicated that New York would acquire the power to tax the lands after a period
of years.' The Court read these provisions as affecting only those lands where
Indian title had been extinguished and noted that the neither New York nor
Massachusetts had any power over tribes or their lands. "
The Kansas Indians and the New York Indians cases starkly illustrate that
states will assert their taxing power over Indian lands even when the existing
law clearly forbids it. In both cases, the state courts upheld the state taxing
power. The bias of state courts in state tax cases is quite natural because the
fiscal health of the state7' that pays the judges' salaries is at stake. These two
62. See U.S. CONST. signature page (Alexander Hamilton was the delegate from New York
who signed on behalf of New York). New York later narrowly ratified the United States
constitution in a ratifying convention. FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A
BIOGRAPI'Y 114-15 (1979) (stating that the vote was 30-27 in favor of ratification).
63. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 766 (18665.
64. rd.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 767.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 769.
69. d.
70. Id.
71. See ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN 164-65 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter DEBO,
WATERS]. Debo described the problem for Oklahoma Territory as it planned for statehood:
Besides the abstract and impersonal desire to "develop the country" and the
individual desire to develop a portion of it for their private interest, the citizens of
the embryo commonwealth were confronted with a serious tax problem. The
[Vol. 23
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cases show that state and local tax administrators are often aggressive and that
the state courts will back them up.
After these two cases, the tax status of Indian lands located within states was
clear. States could not impose property taxes on Indian lands held by a tribe or
held individually by a tribal member holding the property by operation of tribal
law or under federal restrictions imposed by treaty or statute.
B. The Allotment Period: 1887-1934
Federal officials involved in Indian affairs had long believed that individual
Indians would remain "uncivilized" and impoverished so long as tribes
continued to follow systems of communal land ownership.' If a system of
private property replaced tribal ownership, these officials reasoned, then
civilization and prosperity would result.' Federal administrative officials had
held this "private-land-ownership-equals-civilization" view since the early 1800s
and consistently sought ways to implement western style property law within
Indian country.74 Many of the treaties negotiated during the latter decades of
the treaty period included provisions for eliminating tribal ownership of lands
and replacing it with private ownership by members.
Indians had never paid taxes except in a limited sense, and they had consented to
accept their lands in severalty only upon the condition that the allotments should
be non-taxable for a certain period....
In a political society accustomed to rely almost exclusively for its revenue on
the general property tax, this problem seemed insurmountable....
Although it seemed impossible to create a state government without taxation,
the Indian Territory "boosters" were not willing to wait until most of the land
would be taxable; they wished to secure statehood immediately, even before the
date set for the expiration of the tribal governments, and then obtain the premature
removal of the restrictions to deliver them from their difficulties.
Id.
72. John C. Calhoun, Report of the Secretary of War (1818), reprinted in 3 NEw AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 277-89 (1972). In discussing government run trading houses set
up to trade with the Indians, Secretary Calhoun noted that these "trading establishments being
fixed, will, in time, become the nucleus of Indian settlements, which by giving greater density
and steadiness to their population, will tend to introduce a division of real property, and thus
hasten their ultimate civilization." Id. at 284. He advocated allotment of land within reservations:
"The land ought to be divided among families; and the idea of individual property carefully
inculcated." Id. at 285. He saw private ownership of land ultimately leading to assimilation:
"When sufficiently advanced in civilization, they would be permitted to participate in such civil
and political rights, as the respective states within whose limits they are situated, might safely
extend to them." Id.
73. Id. at 277-89.
74. Id.
75. See PRUCHA, TREATIES, supra note 21, at 173 (noting allotment by treaty in the 1832
Treaty with the Creek Nation) and at 242 (noting treaty allotment and its failure in Kansas and
Nebraska during the 1850s).
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In 1887 Congress passed legislation designed to eliminate tribal ownership
of lands and to require individual ownership. 6 Under this system, federal
officials would determine tribal membership, survey tribal lands, and assign
individual allotments to tribal members based on family status." After tribal
members received their individual allotments, the remaining tribal land became
surplus lands that the federal government sold.78 The proceeds of these sales
were kept in accounts for the benefit of tribal members."
During an initial period, the allottees would own a restricted title to the
land.' During the period of restriction, the allottee could not sell his land or
encumber it without federal approval.' Once the allottee had sufficient skill
and education to handle his own financial affairs, the federal government issued
a certificate of competency to the allottee thereby permitting him to sell the
land?9 Under the Act, individual tribal members receiving allotments became
subject to state civil and criminal jurisdiction." In addition, members became
eligible for citizenship if they lived apart from the tribe and adopted civilized
ways."
These jurisdictional and citizenship provisions led states to assert that they
had full civil, criminal, and tax jurisdiction over allotted land and over the
Indians who owned the lands from the point in time that the United States made
the allotment.' The period of restriction related only to the transferability of
the land (and not to state powers) according to this line of cases. In In re
Heffi, a case involving a federal criminal prosecution for selling liquor within
Indian country, the defendant liquor seller asserted that the General Allotment
Act terminated the federal interest.' In Heff, the Court agreed with the
defendant and wrote an opinion that would have meant that states acquired full
civil, criminal, and tax jurisdiction at the time of the allotment and not some
twenty-five years later when the restricted allotment became unrestricted.88
76. General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
77. 1i. §§ 1-3.





83. hI. § 6.
84. hi.
85. See State ex reL Tompton v. Denoyer, 72 N.W. 1014 (N.D. 1897); Wa-La-Note-Tke-
Tynin v. Carter, 53 P. 106 (Idaho 1898); United States v. Rickert, 106 F.l (C.C.D.S.D. 1901),
rev'd, 188 U.S. 432 (1903); In re Now-ge-zhuck, 76 P. 877 (Kan. 1904).
86. 197 U.S. 488 (1905).
87. Ilt at 497.
88. li. at 509. The Court stated:
We are of the opinion that when the United States grants the privileges of
citizenship to an Indian, gives to him the benefit of and requires him to be subject
to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State, it places him outside the reach
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Congress viewed Heff as erroneous and quickly overturned it with the
passage of the Burke Act in 1906." The Burke Act amended the General
Allotment Act to specifically provide that a state did not acquire civil and
criminal jurisdiction until the restrictions on transferability of the land were
lifted." The Burke Act also made it explicit that once restrictions were lifted
the land would be subject to taxation' This taxation provision operated as an
explicit authorization of state taxation, but only after the allottee received a
certificate of competency and after the restrictions on alienation were lifted. The
authorization of state taxation after the period of restriction was an implicit
acknowledgment that until that time the land remained immune from state
taxation.
The allotment process continued from 1887 until 1934. One Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, sounding as if he worked for NAZI Germany, declared the
allotment system a success and referred to it as the "final solution"" to the
of police regulations on the part of Congress; that the emancipation from Federal
control thus created cannot be set aside at the instance of the Government without
the consent of the individual Indian and the State, and that this emancipation from
Federal control is not affected by the fact that the lands it has granted to the Indian
are granted subject to a condition against alienation and encumbrance, or the
further fact that it guarantees to him an interest in tribal or other property.
Id.
89. County of Yakima v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 255 (1992).
90. Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182. This Act provided that:
at the expiration of the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to the
Indians by patent in fee... then each and every allottee shall have the benefit of
and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in
which they may reside ....
Id., 34 Stat. at 182.
91. Id. The Burke Act provided that:
the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, and he is hereby authorized,
whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is competent and capable
of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to such allottee a
patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or
taxation of said land shall be removed and said land shall not be liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuing of such patent: Provided
further, That until the issuance of fee-simple patents all allottees to whom trust
patents shall hereafter be issued shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States ....
Id. at 183.
92. U.S. DEP'r OF INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR (1905) [hereinafter 1905 COMMISSIONER'S REPORT]. Commissioner
Francis E. Leupp stated:
Some one has styled this [the allotment program] a policy of shrinkage, because
every Indian whose name is stricken from a tribal roll by virtue of his
emancipation reduces the dimensions of our red-race problem by a fraction -
very small it may be, but not negligible. If we can thus gradually watch our body
of dependent Indians shrink, even by one member at a time, we may congratulate
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"Indian question.'93 Most historians of Native American history, however, have
concluded that the allotment process caused cultural genocide through
dispossession of Indians from their lands?' The historical record is clear: tribes
lost two-thirds of their lands during this period 5 Most of the lands passed to
land speculators in transactions that often involved fraud or sharp practices.'
In addition, many Indians who did not sell their unrestricted land often lost it
through tax sales because of the nonpayment of state taxes.' Under the federal
allotment legislation, states could tax allotted lands of individual Indians once
the federal government issued a certificate of competency."
In 1934, Congress concluded that the allotment system was a failure.w With
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,"' Congress halted the allotment
process,'' extended the period of restriction indefinitely,"° and attempted to
preserve and reinvigorate tribes as political entities." In 1934, many tribes
ourselves that the final solution is indeed only a question of a few years.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
93. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR (1906) [hereinafter 1906 COMMISSIONER'S REPORT]. Commissioner
Francis E. Leupp stated:
The legislation of recent years shows conclusively that the country is demanding
an end of the Indian question and it is right. The Burke Act, wisely administered,
will accomplish more in this direction than any other single factor developed in
a generation of progress. When it is supplemented by other legislation which will
enable their pro rate shares of the tribal moneys to be paid, principal and interest,
to competent Indian, the beginning of the end will be at hand. Such Indians,
owning their land in fee, and receiving their portions of the tribal property without
restriction can not by any course of action maintain a claim for further
consideration. Through such measures the grand total of the nation's wards will
be diminished daily and at a growing ratio.
Id. at 30.
94. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 329-31 (1970)
[hereinafter DEBO, HISTORY]; WILLIAM T. HAGAN, AMERICAN INDIANS 143 (1961).
95. DEBO, HISTORY, supra note 94, at 331.
It can be shown statistically that Indian holdings declined from 138,000,000 acres
in 1887 to 47,000,000 in 1934. But these figures are misleading, for not all
reservations were allotted; the huge desert holdings of the Navahos were even
increased during the same period. A more accurate indication of what was
happening is the shrinkage of the Five Tribes holdings [in Oklahoma] from
19,500,000 to slightly more than 1,500,000 acres by 1934 (and most of that
worthless, twenty acres of cut-over timber required to support one cow).
Id.
96. See DEBo, WATERS, supra note 71, at 92-125.
97. See HAGAN, supra note 94, at 146.
98. Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182.
99. See DEBO, HISTORY, supra note 94, at 338-39.
100. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 985.
101. Id. § 1.
102. Id. § 2.
103. Id. § 16 (permitting the adoption of tribal constitutions and the formation of tribal
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found themselves within reservations containing land owned mostly by non-
members. 4 In an effort to reconstitute the land base of many of the tribes,
Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire lands for tribes and
to place them in trust." This provision stated that these lands would be
exempt from state taxation.'0 6
Prior to the General Allotment Act, tribal lands on reservations with no
allotment had a clear ownership status. For most tribes, the land within the
reservation boundaries was tribal land to be administered in any way the
individual tribe saw fit based on tribal law. Many tribes had property systems
that used notions of private ownership"4 - a fact that suggests that the federal
policy of bringing private ownership to individual Indians was a ruse for
unlocking Indian lands for the benefit ef land speculators." The rapid loss. of
ownership suggests that this was the actual intent behind the allotment process.
After 1934, the legal status of Indian lands varied tremendously. Within a
reservation, one could find state land, federal land, restricted allotted land,
unrestricted allotted land, original tribal land (held under tribal property rules),
land reacquired by the federal government and held in trust for the tribe, land
purchased and owned by members, and private land.'" Some Indian tribes had
no formal reservation boundaries but their land was viewed as "Indian country"
because the tribes were "dependent Indian communities.""'  Within a
dependent Indian community, one could find the same variety of land ownership
as within a reservation. Outside of reservations and dependent Indian
communities, individual Indians continued to hold restricted allotments, the
federal government could also acquire lands and hold them in trust for a tribe,
and tribes could purchase lands and hold title in the tribe.
When the federal government instituted the allotment process, it fully
expected that after twenty-five years or so no tribes would exist. It also
expected that all Indian lands would pass into private ownership and be subject
to state taxation. Instead, tribes survived this "final solution," and Congress
abandoned its failed policy. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, however,
did not return tribes to the position they occupied prior to 1887. The 1934
legislation froze the allotment process and tribes found themselves in various
governments); id. § 17 (permitting the formation of tribally owned and controlled corporations).
104. See L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising
Sovereignty and the Constitution, 20 U.C. DAvis L.-REv. 53, 122-49 (1994) (describing land
ownership and demographic patterns on various reservations).
105. Ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985.
106. Id.
107. DBO, HISTORY, supra note 94, at 128.
108. HAGAN, supra note 94, at 144.
109. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The
Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1477-78.
110. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978); United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S.
535 (1938); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
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conditions - many with no formal reservations, some with diminished
reservalions, some with reservations containing little tribal lands, and some
largely unaffected. At the beginning of the allotment process, states could not
tax Indian lands. At the end of the process Congress expected that there would
be no Indian lands and that states would then be free to tax all these former
Indian lands. The allotment process never finished, so where were states left
with their power to tax Indian lands? Part of the answer hinges on the meaning
of "Indian country," a phrase of continuing importance in defining the
limitations of states' power of taxation involving Indian lands.
IlL. Indian Country
In the ongoing struggle between tribes and states, the courts often use the
phrase "Indian country" as the construct for establishing the limits of state
power."' In addition, courts have used the concept of "Indian country" to
define the limits of a state's power to tax."'
Indian country is a fairly old concept predating the formation of the United
States by nearly a century."' In the Proclamation of 1763 King George I1 of
England explicitly reserved lands for Indian tribes and nations and fixed their
boundaries to prevent white encroachments."' Early federal legislation used
"Indian country" to describe the political boundary separating the United States
from the Indian tribes."' As time passed, the line continued to move west."'
111. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) (state criminal jurisdiction hinged on
determination of an area being Indian country).
112. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 575 U.S. 450 n.2 (1995) (limiting
imposition of various state taxes based on the definition of Indian country); Oklahoma Tax
Comm'rn v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993).
113. See Act XV, Apr. 1691, 3 Va. Stat. 82, 84-85 (1823), where the Colonial Virginia
legislature provided the fixing of a boundary line:
And forasmuch as by a clause of the 8th act of assembly, made at James City,
October the tenth, 1665, it is enacted that the bounds of the Indians on the south
side James river, be from the heads of the Southern branches of the Black water
to the Appomatuck Indians, and thence to the Manokin Town, for the better
explaining and ascertaining the bounds betwixt the English and Indians on the
south side of James River.
Id.
114. Proclamation of 1763 (Oct. 7, 1763), reprinted in 3 THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE
UNrrEI) STATEs 2135, 2137 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1973) (reserved lands for Indian tribes
and nations and prohibited purchase or settlement of the lands without royal approval).
115. In its first Indian trading statute, Congress used the phrase "Indian country" to describe
the political territory of the various tribes. See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat, 137, 137-
38. Th-. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802 clearly identified the boundaries of Indian country.
Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139. The act prohibited white settlers' unlicensed entry into
Indian country and also required passports as a condition to entry. Id. §§ 2-3, 2 Stat. at 138-39.
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This federal legislation reflected the commonly accepted idea that tribes were
separate, self-governing political entities. Whether Indian country included lands
within existing states was not initially clear."' By the end of the nineteenth
century Indian country came to mean that territory where tribes retained
autonomy."'
During the early part of the twentieth century, when federal policy, through
the allotment process, actively sought to destroy tribes as political entities,
Indian country was not a statutorily defined term."" The lack of a statutory
definition should not have been a problem because Congress expected Indian
country to no longer exist twenty-five years after the commencement of the
allotment process. After 1934 and the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act,
the future political existence of tribes became more certain. In response to
jurisdictional problems in enforcing state and federal criminal laws on Indian
lands, Congress in 1948 adopted ajurisdictional definition of Indian country for
purposes of applying the Major Crimes Act." The statute, contained in 18
U.S.C. § 1151, defines Indian country as:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this
title, the term "Indian country," as used in this chapter means
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through
the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state,
and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.'
Federal courts have recently started using section 1151 to define Indian country
when deciding the reach of state taxing power over Indian lands. The Supreme
all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within the states
pf Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and also, that part of the
United States east of the Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the
Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this act, be taken and
deemed to be the Indian country.
Id.
117. FElux S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 6 (Univ. of N.M. photo.
reprint 1971) (1942) [hereinafter COHEN].
118. Id.
119. Id. at 7 (noting that the courts tended to use concepts borrowed from the Trade and
Intercourse Acts).
120. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(1994)).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
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Court's first explicit use of section 1151 to limit state taxing power was in
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation.' That case involved
Oklahoma's attempt to impose its income and motor vehicle excise taxes on
tribal members." The Court found that a dispositive inquiry in determining
the state's power to tax was the status of the land as Indian country within the
meaning of section 1151." A subsequent case, Oklahoma Tax Commission
v. Chickasaw Nation," involved Oklahoma's income and gasoline excise
taxes." The Supreme Court again looked to section 1151 and its definition of
Indian country to determine the limits of the state's power to tax."V Based on
these cases, the status of land as Indian country under section 1151 is a critical
determination and is bound to affect the state's power to impose real property
taxes on Indian lands or lands located within Indian country.
Why the Supreme Court has decided to use the section 1151 definition of
Indian country in state tax cases is unclear. The Court has not explained why
it has started using a criminal jurisdictional statute as a limitation on state taxing
power. The purpose of section 1151 is to establish the jurisdiction of federal
courts over major crimes that Native Americans commit within Indian country.
In its application, then, section 1151 defines the federal interest in regulating
criminal behavior in Indian country. As already noted, states do not have
criminal jurisdiction over Indians within Indian country. Section 1151, however,
does not itself establish this rule. Instead, section 1151 reflects the federal
policy that Congress, in the absence of state criminal jurisdiction, has taken the
power to prosecute major crimes from tribes and taken over the responsibility
itself."M Theoretically, then, Indian country, as defined in section 1151 could
very well be too broad or too narrow in establishing the limits of state taxing
power." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court for now seems to have adopted the
section 1151 definition in the state taxation arena. The discussion below
122. 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993).
123. Id. at 120.
124. Id. at 123.
125. 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
126. Id. at 453.
127. Id.
128. The federal policy of asserting major crime jurisdiction over Indians within Indian
country and exclusive of states developed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Exparte
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), which held that the killing of one Indian by another was not
a violation of the federal homicide statute because of an explicit exception for crimes within
Indian country. Id. at 405. In 1885 Congress expressly provided major crime jurisdiction within
Indian country. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385, which the United States Supreme
Court upheld as a proper exercise of Congress' plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-81 (1886).
129. But see, e.g., Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, n. 9 (1997) (rejecting
application of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994) for purposes of determining Indian country where a tribal
court's jurisdiction was involved over parties in a tort action occurring on a state highway (right-
of-way) located within the tribe's reservation).
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provides a brief overview of the three categories of Indian country described in
section 1151.
A. Reservation Lands and the Problem of Diminishment
In the case of reservations, the actual ownership and status of lands located
within the boundaries of a reservation are irrelevant to the determination of
whether an area is Indian country."3 Section 1151 makes it clear that all lands
within a reservation boundary are Indian country even though the United States
may have issued a patent (fee title that is unrestricted in ownership) or a right-
of-way.' Instead, the boundary of the reservation is the critical inquiry.
The actual boundary is not usually that difficult to ascertain because treaties,
federal statutes, and executive orders are usually precise in describing the land
areas affected." The principal difficulty arises in cases involving
diminishment or disestablishment of reservations. During the allotment period,
two-thirds of tribal lands passed out of tribal and member ownership. Much
of the land affected was the subject of special legislation. Whether this
legislation diminished or disestablished a reservation was not always clear. The
overall purpose of the allotment process was to terminate tribes as political
entities and to convert all Indian lands into private land that would be freely
transferable in the marketplace.TM Because Congress reversed course and
ended the allotment process in 1934, the status of some reservations that lost
most or all of their lands is unclear.
The diminishment of reservations is a question the Supreme Court has
addressed several times. The leading diminishment case is Hagen v. Utah.35
Hagen involved a state criminal prosecution of an Indian, who the State of Utah
had charged with distribution of drugs in the Town of Myton.'TM Myton was
located within the boundaries of the reservation created in 1861 and also on
lands declared as "surplus lands" under a 1905 statute following allotment of the
reservation. 3 ' The federal government opened these surplus lands to white
settlement offering the lands for $1.25 an acre."
In this context, the Court determined whether the various federal statutes had
diminished the 1861 reservation boundaries. If so, then Hagen would have
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1994).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Executive Order of Nov. 8, 1873, reprinted in I INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAW AND
TREATIES 837 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904). The order was adopted as legislation by Congress
in the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 19, 26 Stat. 989, 1026-29 (involving the establishment and
boundary determinations for the Coeur d'Alene reservation).
133. HAGAN, supra note 94, at 147.
134. Id. at 139-41.
135. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
136. Id. at 408.
137. Id. at 401-02.
138. Id. at 407.
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committed his alleged crime outside of Indian country and would have been
properly within the jurisdiction of the state court. To determine diminishment
when Congress opened reservations to white settlement, the Court considered
three factors: (1) the language of the federal statutes, (2) the historical context
of the relevant legislation, and (3) the race of those who settled the land after
opening it to settlement.'39 In applying these factors, the Court indicated that
it should follow the accepted cannon of construction applied in federal Indian
law, namely, that ambiguities are construed in favor of the Indians.'"' The
United States, through the Solicitor of the United States, filed an amicus curiae
brief in support of the defendant and argued that the Court should adopt a "clear
statement rule" in diminishment cases."" Such a rule would require the state
and federal courts to find no diminishment of Indian reservations unless (1)
there was explicit language of cession and (2) an unconditional commitment
from Congress to compensate the Indians.42
The Court in Hagen rejected the "clear statement rule," and instead decided
that determinations regarding reservation diminishment requires an examination
of all the circumstances surrounding the opening of the reservation.43 The
"facts-and-circumstances" approach in Hagen means that diminishment
determinations must take place on a case-by-case basis. Such an approach
means reservation boundaries of "opened" reservations will remain unclear until
the federal courts make authoritative judicial determinations. This is especially
troublesome in the tax area because determinations that land is within Indian
country affect both state and tribal taxation.'"
The Supreme Court, in South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe," just decided
another diminishment case that illustrates this important point. The case
involved the application of environmental laws to a landfill." The
classification of the land as Indian country or not-Indian country determined
whether federal or state environmental laws and regulations applied to the
landfill operating on non-Indian owned land within a disputed boundary of the
reservation.' 7 The Court relied primarily on the approach followed in Hagen,
finding that words of cession and the payment of a specific sum created a strong
presumption of diminishment.'" The Court found diminishment even though
139. Id. at 411.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 411-12.
143. Id. at 412.
144. See, e.g., Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294 (8th Cir. 1994)
(applicability of tribal possessory interest and oil production taxes challenged based on taxpayer's
assertion that Congress had diminished the tribe's reservation).
145. 118 S. Ct. 789 (1998).
146. Id. at 796.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 798.
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the agreement that the United States government negotiated with the tribe,
which Congress approved by legislation, guaranteed continuation of rights under
an earlier treaty that had established the reservation boundaries.49 The
subsequent cession agreement did not address the boundary question, and later
federal actions took place under the assumption that the pre-cession boundaries
remained in effect."' Given this apparent ambiguity, the Court nonetheless
found diminishment.' Yankton Sioux amply illustrates the difficulty in
diminishment cases. Any prior federal action that opened tribal lands to non-
Indian ownership raises the specter of diminishment. As a result, the taxing
power of tribes and states is often unclear.
B. Dependent Indian Communities
Potential diminishment or disestablishment create land status uncertainty in
the case of some reservations, but the status of lands as a dependent Indian
communitys is even more unclear. The concept of a dependent Indian
community developed at the beginning of this century and dealt primarily with
the Pueblos located in the American southwest.' The federal government had
dealt with the Pueblos as if they were Indian tribes." 4 Their political status
and the status of their lands, however, did not follow the pattern of federal
treaties, executive orders, and federal legislation."5 Instead, the Pueblos, many
of which could claim aboriginal title through continuous occupation of the lands
from a time prior to the European arrival, held title through land grants from the
Spanish crown, confirmed by the Mexican government (the political successor
in interest to Spain), and confirmed again by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
which established the boundaries between Mexico and the United States and
confirmed the property rights of those occupants of lands now located in the
United States and formerly located within Mexico."
From that beginning point involving the Pueblo Indians, the definition of a
dependent Indian community has varied and developed, not yet having settled
into a definition with any definite limits. The First,"s Second,", Eighth,"'
149. Id. at 795 n.l.
150. Id. at 796.
151. Id. at 805.
152. Indian country includes dependent Indian communities. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1994).
153. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 38-40..
156. Id. at 45.
157. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Electric Co., 89 F.3d 908, 919 (1st Cir. 1996)
(relying on the four-factor test summarized in United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 838
(8th Cir. 1981) the court found that a predominantly Indian community living on tribally owned
land located outside of the reservation and used for a housing project was not a dependent Indian
community because the federal government had not set apart the land for the use of the tribe).
158. United States v. Cook, 922 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d. Cir. 1991), cert. denied 500 U.S. 941,
118 S. Ct. 568 (1991) (applying a three-factor test that considers (1) the nature of the area, (2)
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Ninth,"6 and Tenth 6' Federal Circuits have developed slightly different
definitions. And an important case involving the definition of dependent Indian
community is currently pending before the Supreme Court."2  All of the
existing definitions are fairly general and often require extensive factual
determinations. In many cases, the actual boundary of a dependent Indian
community will also be unclear. As a result, the status of any specific parcel of
land that might be a dependent Indian community is likewise unclear.
In almost all cases involving lands other than Pueblos in the southwest, the
determination that a particular area is a dependent Indian community will
require litigation. Often the litigation will be complex because of the interplay
of various federal Indian law rules. Land within a dependent Indian community
is Indian country. If a tribe or a member of a tribe owns the land, then a state's
power to tax will not extend to these lands under the holdings of the Kansas
Indians and the New York Indians cases. Obviously, state taxing authorities, in
the absence of a clear judicial determination, will tax now and ask questions
later, leaving it up to the property owner to contest the validity of the tax. These
disputes will normally arise in state court, putting the tribe or the tribal member
at a distinct disadvantage.
C. Restricted Allotments
This type of Indian country" is usually the easiest to determine in terms
of status because the original allotment retains its restricted status until lifted by
the relationship of the inhabitants to the tribe and the federal government, and (3) the established
practices of governmental agencies towards the area). In Alaska v. Venetie Tribal Government,
118 S. Ct. 948 (1998), the United States Supreme Court held that a dependent Indian community
arises only when (1) the land has been set apart by the federal government and (2) the tribe and
the land are under federal superintendence, Id. at 954.
159. United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 838 (8th Cir. 1981) (adopting a four-
factor test that considers (1) whether the United States has retained title and authority over the
land, (2) the nature of the area, the relationship of the inhabitants to the tribe and to the federal
government, and the practices of governmental agencies toward the area, (3) whether there is
cohesive community based on common economic pursuits, common interests, or needs of the
inhabitants, and (4) whether that land has been set apart for the use of the Indian peoples).
160. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, l01 F.2d 1286, 1292 (1996), cert. granted, 117
S. Ct. 2478 (1997) (adopting a six factor test that considers: (I) the nature of the area, (2) the
relationship of the area inhabitants to Indian tribes and the federal government, (3) the established
practice of governmental agencies toward the area, (4) the degree of federal ownership of and
control over the area, 5) the cohesiveness of the inhabitants, and 6) the extent that the area has
been set aside for the exclusive use of Indian people), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998) (holding that
only federal set-asid plus federal superintendence will make land into a dependent Indian
community).
161. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.2d 1531, 1545 (10th Cir. 1995)
(adopting the four-factor test used by the eighth circuit in United States v. South Dakota, 665
F.2d 837, 838 (8th Cir. 1981)).
162. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 101 F.2d 1286 (1996), cert. granted 117 S.Ct.
2478 (1997).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1994).
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affirmative action taken by the Department of Interior." Determination of
ownership interests is often very difficult because the original allottee frequently
has hundreds of potential heirs resulting from a number of successive
generations." In any case, the tax status of most restricted allotments is quite
clear. By federal statute," restricted allotted land remains exempt from state
taxation. In the absence of specific statutory provisions, restricted allotted land
should remain exempt from state taxation under the holding in the Kansas
Indians case so long as the tribe retains its political status and the member
retains his or her affiliation with the tribe. This exemption from state taxation
also applies whether or not the land is located within or outside of a
reservation."6
D. Unrestricted Allotments Owned by Tribal Members
Congress fully intended that Indian-owned land, once its transferability
became unrestricted, would have the same status as all other land within a
particular state." Specifically, the land would become subject to state
taxation." The General Allotment Act, as amended by the Burke Act, was
explicit about state taxing power following the lifting of restrictions.Y For
other Indian lands that were allotted under treaty provisions, the tax status was
not so clear.
The Supreme Court, in Pennock v. Commissioner," addressed the power
of the State of Kansas to tax lands held in fee simple by a member of the Sac
164. See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994).
165. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987). The court noted that the
policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved disastrous for the Indians. Cash
generated by the land sales to whites was quickly dissipated .... The failure of
the allotment program became even clearer as successive generations came to hold
the allotted lands. Thus 40-, 80-, and 160-acre parcels became splintered into
multiple undivided interests in land, with some parcels having hundreds, and many
parcels having dozens, of owners. Because the land was held in trust and often
could not be alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew over time.
Id.
166. Actually, the exemption is an implied one. Under 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994), restricted
land becomes subject to taxation when the restrictions are lifted. This provision implies that the
land is tax-exempt until that time.
167. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993). The court
stated:
our cases make clear that a tribal member need not live on a formal reservation
to be outside the State's taxing jurisdiction; it is enough that the member live in
"Indian country." Congress has defined Indian country broadly to include formal
and informal reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments,
whether restricted or held in trust by the United States.
Id.
168. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994).
169. Id.
170. Act of Mar. 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182.
171. 103 U.S. 44 (1880).
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
and Fox Tribe." In 1842 the federal government removed the Sac and Fox
Tribe from its reservation on the Mississippi to one located on the Missouri
River." By operation of the terms contained in a treaty entered into in 1859,
the federal government allotted tribal lands to individual members and sold the
surplus lands. 74 Under the treaty, the allotted lands remained restricted and
exempt from state taxation." Under the treaty, half-bloods and full-blooded
women married to white men, received much larger allotments but were not
entitled to share in the proceeds from the sale of the surplus lands.76 The tax
status of these special and large allotments was not entirely clear." In 1867
the Sac and Fox Tribe and the United States entered into another treaty that
provided for the tribe's removal to the Indian Territory (Oklahoma).' Under
the 1867 treaty, the half bloods and the full bloods with white husbands were
entitled to fee title to the lands that they had received under the 1860 treaty.'
The Indian owner of the land in question, Sarah Pennock, was a half blood
who had received hef allotment under the terms of the 1860 treaty." Pennock
remained in Kansas after the Sac and Fox Tribe was forced to move to
Oklahoma. 8' She received an unrestricted fee title from the United States for
her land in Kansas." She also maintained her membership in the tribe even
though she remained behind in Kansas."
Under these facts, the Supreme Court interpreted the treaty provisions
granting tax exemption as not extending to these specific lands. ' The
language of the three treaties nowhere specifically authorized state taxation of
the lands. The Court nonetheless construed the tax exemption provisions
narrowly given the title to the land (fee simple) and the departure of the
tribe."8 In distinguishing the Kansas Indians case, the Court noted that the
tribe involved in the earlier case continued to exist within Kansas and that the
treaty provisions granting tax exemption remained in effect until the federal
government lifted them." The process of assimilation also was important to
the CourL The Court pointed out that Pennock was an Indian of the half-blood,
that she married a white man (following the death of her first husband who was
172. id. at 44-45.
173. Id. at 45.
174. Id. at 46.
175. M.
176. d. These individuals received 320 acres instead of 80.
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a full blooded member of the tribe), that her white husband was a citizen of
Kansas, and that she chose to remain in Kansas after her tribe's departure to
Oklahoma.' Because of her assimilation and her unrestricted ownership of
her land, "she and her property have come under the control of the State, and
are subject to its laws, entitled to its protection, and bound to bear a portion of
its burdens."'"
Twenty-six years later, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
a state could impose its property tax on Indian-owned land located within a
reservation where the title had become unrestricted by operation of treaty
provisions. In Goudy v. Meath" the Supreme Court held that allotted land that
became unrestricted (freely transferable by the Indian owner) was subject to
state taxation unless Congress expressly provided otherwise.)" The lands in
Goudy were lands allotted under the terms of a 1854 treaty between the United
States and the Puyallup Tribe.' Goudy, the Indian owner, received the lands
through a patent that the United States issued in 1886).' In 1893, Congress
passed a law restricting the transferability of allotted lands located within the
Puyallup reservation for a ten-year period." After the restriction period ended,
the county began imposing its ad valorem real property tax."
In the decision of the Washington Supreme court,"5 Goudy asserted that,
under the Supreme Court's decision in the Kansas Indians case, his land
remained immune from state taxation until Congress explicitly authorized the
taxation.' In rejecting this argument, the state court interpreted the 1893
statute as implicitly authorizing taxation after the period of restrictions on
alienation expired." In its factual findings, the court noted that Goudy had
become a citizen of the State of Washington and had severed all political
allegiance with his tribe." This fact suggests that continued tribal existence
and a member's political membership in the tribe made a difference in
determining the reach of the state's power.
Emphasis on Goudy's political status was rational from the state's point of
view and within the context of federal Indian law because states, then as now,
had no power over tribes or their lands except to the extent granted by
Congress. By the same token, as tribes located within states went out of
187. Id. at 44-47.
188. Id. at 48.
189. 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
190. Id. at 149.
191. Id. at 146.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 147.
194. 1l
195. Goudy v. Meath, 80 P. 295 (Wash. 1905).
196. Id. at 296-97.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 296.
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existence or decreased in political and geographical size, state power and
jurisdiction expanded to fill the void. During the treaty making period, treaties
with tribes served to define political boundaries. It was the explicit assumption
of most. federal officials during the nineteenth century that tribes would not
continue to exist within states."t Instead, tribes would either go out of
existence or move to the Indian territory.
During the treaty-making period, tribal lands decreased rapidly as the federal
government purchased lands that then became part of the public domain located
within a territory or later a state. In contrast, the allotment process, which
involved Indians staying on lands instead of being moved to reservations, called
into question the tax status of lands during the process. The court in Goudy,
however, was unconcerned that the land involved remained within the
boundaries of the tribe's reservation. The court's disregard for the tribe's
boundaries and political existence is understandable because the federal policy
at the time was to eliminate tribes and to eliminate Indian lands as a type of
land ownership. In the eyes of the court, the tribe scarcely existed politically
and was something that would become a mere memory.
In 1934 Congress concluded that its allotment/assimilation policy was a
failure."' After forty-seven years of allotment, most Native Americans
remained unassimilated and, having lost two-thirds of their land, much
poorer?3 With the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Congress attempted to
revitalize tribes, permit self-government, and encourage economic development
on reservations. = Following the end of the allotment process, much of the
land within reservations was unrestricted in ownership and some of the acreage
was held by tribal members. = In some case, the members and their
descendants merely retained ownership of lands that the federal government had
allotted to them.'
The ability of the state to tax these member-owned fee lands located within
a reservation came into question in 1992 in the case of County of Yakima v.
Yakima Indian Nation. In that case, the United States Supreme Court
answered the question whether the State of Washington could impose its ad
valorem property tax on unrestricted fee lands within the Yakima Reservation
199. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (Nov. 6, 1858),
reprinted in S. ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 35th Cong. 353, 358 (1858) ("In all cases where the necessities
of our rapidly increasing population have compelled us to displace the Indian, we have ever
regarded it as a sacred and binding obligation to provide him with a home elsewhere ... .
200. DEBO, HISTORY, supra note 94, at 338.
201. Id. at 332-33.
202. U.S. DEP'r OF INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRErARY OF INTERIOR 78-80
(1934) [hereinafter 1934 SECRETARY'S REPORT].
203. Id. at 79.
204. Id. at 81.
205. 502 U.S. 251 (1991).
[Vol. 23
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss1/3
TAXATION OF TRIBAL FEE LANDS
and owned by members and by the ttibe.' The General Allotment Act as
amended by the Burke Act, according to the court's holding, explicitly precluded
state taxation of restricted allotted lands and explicitly permitted state taxation
of those lands once the restrictions were lifted through the process of
determining competency of the Indian owner to manage his or her property.'
The tribe, on its own behalf and on behalf of its members who owned fee
land within the reservation, acknowledged that Congress through the General
Allotment Act and the Burke Act which amended it, authorized state taxation
of allotted land once the restrictions were lifted.' The tribe asserted, however,
that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 effectively repealed these
provisions.' The Court, in construing the two statutes, found no express
repealer language in the Indian Reorganization Act and concluded that the
congressional authorization of state taxation found in the General Allotment Act
and the Burke Act remained valid." Before reaching this conclusion, the
Court reiterated the general rule of federal Indian law that states have no power
over tribes or their members within Indian country except to the extent that
Congress grants power to a state."' This general rule extends to taxation and
bars state taxation of tribes or members within Indian country unless authorized
by Congress.'
In construing the three statutes (the General Allotment Act, the Burke Act,
and the Indian Reorganization Act), the Court purported to follow an approach
that would find authorization of state taxation only if Congress' intention to
permit such taxation was "unmistakably clear." ' 3 Congress' intention in the
General Allotment Act and the Burke Act was unmistakably clear and exposed
unrestricted lands to state taxation. The intention, however, became unclear
when Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act. To deal with the
resulting ambiguity, the Court applied the rule of statutory construction that
existing statutes are not repealed by implication" The Court failed to explain
why this particular rule of construction should apply in the area of federal
Indian law where the Court has consistently followed the rule of construction
that "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with
ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.
'215
206. Id. at 270.
207. Id. at 264.
208. Id. at 259.
209. Id. at 260.
210. Id. at 262.
211. Id. at 258.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 262.
215. The Court's failure to use this pro-tribe cannon of construction is quite mysterious
because the court later used it to invalidate Washington's land sales excise tax that applied to the
same lands.
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The tribe and the United States, as amicus curiae, relied on the Supreme
Court's earlier decision in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 6
which had held, among other things, that Montana could not tax activity of
tribal members taking place within the reservation"1 7 and, in some cases, on
lands that were unrestricted fee lands!"1 The tribe and the United States in
Yakima asserted that Moe, by granting tax exempt status to those member
activities on unrestricted fee land, acknowledged that the Indian Reorganization
Act had effectively repealed the tax authorization contained in the General
Allotment Act as amended by the Burke Act.2 9 The Court, however, rejected
this argument by pointing out that the Moe case did not involve the state's
power to tax the fee land itself.2L
The parties in Yakima also disputed the validity of another state tax."2 The
State of Washington imposed an excise tax on all lands sales within the
state.' The Court applied the same reasoning it had used to evaluate the
validity of the ad valorem real property tax to, conclude that the excise tax was
invalid." 3 The Court reiterated that states cannot tax tribes or their members
within Indian country unless clearly authorized by Congress.' In this case,
the Court concluded that the phrase "taxation of land," as contained in the Burke
Act, when construed in light of the doctrine that statutes should be interpreted
in favor of Indians, did not extend to an excise tax on the sale of unrestricted
lands.m This conclusion, to the extent it embraces the doctrine that statutes
are inteipreted in favor of Indians, is inconsistent with the Court's holding
validating the ad valorem real property tax. The Court was unwilling to concede
that the Indian Reorganization Act impliedly repealed the tax authorization
language in the General Allotment Act and the Burke Act because of another
statutory rule of construction that statutes are not repealed by implication.'
E. Unrestricted Tribal Lands
The Yakima case, in addition to resolving the state taxation question
involving member-owned fee lands, also addressed the state's power to tax fee
lands that the tribe owned.m The Court made no analytical distinction between
216. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
217. Id at 476.
218. Id at 477-78.
219. Yakima, 502 U.S. at 260-61.
220. Id. at 262.
221. Id at 268.
222. Id.
223. Id at 268-69.
224. d at 269.
225. Id
226. The Court failed to explain why no-implied-repeal cannon of construction should
control over that cannon that ambiguous status are construed in favor of the tribe.
227. Yakima, 502 U.S. at 256.
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member ownership and tribal ownership of the lands. The failure to draw any
analytical distinction between the tribe and its members is a critical error.
At the fundamental level of statutory construction, the distinction between
members and the tribe is very important. The General Allotment Act
specifically and the allotment process in general took land from tribal ownership
and gave it to individual members. The statutory provision granting the state the
power to tax involved lands held by members after the restrictions on alienation
were lifted. By its terms, then, the statutory grant of authority to the state to tax
the land was directed only at land held by individual members. The statute does
not expressly authorize the state to tax the tribe on its ownership of land.
Indeed, the general rule then, as now, is that the state has no power to tax a
tribe's lands or activities within Indian country unless Congress clearly and
unmistakably permits it. Neither the General Allotment Act nor the Burke Act
expressly permits state taxation of lands that the tribe owns.
The absence of such an authorization in these statutes is actually quite
logical. These statutes had as their goal the elimination of tribes as political
entities and as owners of property. Congress did not expect its allotment
program to fail. Because Congress did not think that tribes going through the
allotment process would continue to exist, it made sense that Congress would
provide no specific rule to govern the taxability of lands that tribes would later
reacquire more than forty-seven years later when Congress prudently scrapped
its allotment policy in favor of tribal self-government.
The Court's reading of the General Allotment Act is flawed. The Court is
essentially saying that states can tax unrestricted allotted land without limitation.
Such a conclusion obviously reads too much into the grant of the taxing power
in the General Allotment Act and the Burke Act. For example, if the federal
government acquires title to unrestricted allotted land through purchase or
condemnation, the state cannot then impose its ad valorem real property tax on
the land or its improvements even though the General Allotment Act says that
allotted lands that become unrestricted will be subject to state taxation.M Any
land and improvements now owned by the federal government would remain
exempt from state property taxation under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity. The property remains immune from state taxation because the federal
government owns it and is itself immune from state taxation.
Indian tribes, as governments within the federal system, enjoy immunity from
state taxation on their lands located and their activities conducted within Indian
228. The doctrine of federal immunity from state taxation has continued as a fundamental
constitutional principle since its first judicial articulation in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819) (invalidating a state tax on a national bank). In 1982, the Supreme Court
stated that a state may not lay a tax directly upon the United States. United States v. New
Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733 (1982) (case involving imposition of the New Mexico gross receipts
tax imposed on federal contractors).
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country. This immunity remains intact unless and until Congress removes
it.'o The General Allotment Act and the Burke Act did nothing to alter the tax
immunity of the tribe. These statutes did not alter the tax immunity of the
various Indian tribes because the allotment program did not deal with tribal
acquisition of lands. Instead, the statutes operated to take lands out of tribal
ownership.
A much more reliable indicator of congressional authorization of state
taxation is Congress' determination of reservation boundaries. Historically, the
boundary between Indian country and non-Indian country has had an important
legal significance for marking the territorial line limiting state power over tribes.
When the reservation system became more prevalent, these boundaries retained
the same political and legal significance as the earlier east/west frontier
boundary that marked off Indian country. The modern definition of Indian
country found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 retains "reservation" as the primary category
of Indian country. The Supreme Court uses this definition when dealing with
the reach of state taxing power. So, it makes sense, then, that the Court should
not abandon this approach unless Congress makes its intent unmistakably clear
with regard to tribally owned lands.
The failure of the Court in Yakima to provide more deference to tribal
sovereignty is quite appalling. The Court glibly concludes that the problem for
the triba is a statutory one and that the tribe can seek relief from Congress. In
reality, Congress has enacted a maze of conflicting laws growing out of
conflicting policies. When Congress enacts laws that are less than clear, who
should bear the brunt of the resulting confusion? The well-known canon of
statutory construction requiring statutes to be construed in favor of the tribal
interest31 would have been the rational approach in the Yakima case. If it is
not clear whether a state can tax fee land that a tribe owns and that is located
within the tribe's reservation, then the state is in the best position to rectify the
legislative confusion. States, through the United States Senate, have political
representation in Congress.' Each state as a political part of the United States
has a say in Congress. Moreover, each state has popular representation in
Congress through the House of Representatives. 3 Many of the senators and
representatives in Congress are former state, city, and county officialse who
are sympathetic to the need of individual states to exercise their tax authority.
229. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 (1995).
230. Id.
231. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1974).
232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (specifying that each state shall have two senators appointed by
the legislature of each state); id. amend. XVII (requiring senators to be elected by a popular vote
within each state).
233. U.S. CONST. art. L § 2.
234. It is quite common for members of Congress to serve in state and local political offices
prior to running for federal office,
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Native Americans and their tribes, in contrast, have no political
representation or virtually no popular representation in Congress. As a
result, it is much more difficult for tribes to seek and to receive statutory
solutions to problems resulting from statutory confusion.
The litigation that has resulted from the Yakima case helps illustrate the point
that tribes are not well positioned to resist state attempts to impose their
property taxes on tribal lands. After Yakima, at least four states (Colorado,.
Michigant Minnesota,' and Washington T9 ) have taken the position that
all fee lands that a tribe owns are subject to state property taxation even when
the land had not originally been allotted under the General Allotment Act, ®
F. Lower Court Litigation After Yakima
1. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County?'
The State of Washington, the state involved in the Yakima case, asserted its
power to tax tribal fee lands located within the boundaries of the Lummi Tribe's
reservation."2 The Lummi Tribe asserted that the holding in Yakima did not
apply to it because the land it held had been allotted under the Treaty of Port
Elliot and not the General Allotment Act 3 The tribe pointed out that the
Treaty of Point Elliot did not authorize the State of Washington to impose its
property taxes.2 The tribe purchased the four parcels of land that were the
subject matter of the litigation.u At the time of purchase of each parcel, the
restrictions on alienation had been lifted in accordance with the procedures
specified in the treaty.'
235. By definition, tribes can have no political representation because they have no senatorial
representation. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, although a Native American, represents the State of
Colorado in the United States Senate. He does not represent any specific tribe or group of tribes.
The House of Representatives has no Native American members.
236. See Southern Ute Tribe v. County of La Plata, 855 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Colo. 1994),
rev'd, 61 F.3d 916 (10th Cir. 1995) (on grounds of ripeness).
237. United States v. Michigan, 106 F.3d 130 (6th Cir. 1997).
238. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 108 F.3d 820 (1997), cert.
granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1997).
239. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512
U.S. 1228 (1994).
240. The Yakima case left open this issue and remanded it to the federal district court for
further consideration. County of Yalima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 270 (1992).
The subsequent decision on this issue has not been reported.
241. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512
U.S. 1228 (1994).
242. Id. at 1356.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1357.
245. Id, at 1356.
246. Id. at 1356-57.
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Washington argued that the underlying source of the fee title (the Treaty of
Port Elliot or the General Allotment Act) was not relevant. Instead, the state
asserted that the status of the land as freely alienable was the basis for
taxation.' The Ninth Circuit went back to the Supreme Court's decision in
Yakima and interpreted it as relying on alienability as the basis for taxationw
Such an interpretation of Yakima ignores the finding of the Court that section
6 of the General Allotment Act (as amended by the Burke Act) with its explicit
taxation language provided the clear manifestation of congressional intent
necessary to permit the state to tax2 9 The Ninth Circuit emphasized the
Supreme Court's reliance on Goudy v. Meath, in Lummi Indian Tribe v.
Whatcom County, a 1906 case in which the Supreme Court upheld the power
of the State of Washington to tax allotted land that had become unrestricted
through treaty provisions' In Goudy, the Supreme Court found that
alienability, coupled with citizenship and severance of tribal relations, was
sufficient to permit state taxation.'
The Ninth Circuit's indirect reliance on Goudy is entirely misplaced. First,
the Supreme Court in Yakima cited Goudy, not as binding precedent, but merely
to illustrate that earlier courts had equated the assumption of state civil and
criminal jurisdiction with extension of the states' power to tax.m This aspect
of Goiudy is no longer good law, having been effectively overruled by the
Supreme Court in Bryan v. Itasca Countyz In Bryan, the Supreme Court
held that the grant to Minnesota of civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian
tribes by operation of Public Law 280 did not represent a specific congressional
authorization of state taxation 5" The Court in Bryan reiterated the point that
a state cannot tax tribes or their members within Indian country absent clear and
explicit congressional authorization z5
Second, Goudy is no longer good law because Congress reversed the
statutory and judicial basis on which Goudy relied. The Court in Goudy
relied on In re Heff to establish that with the citizenship granted under the
General Allotment Act came state taxation. Congress, unhappy with the Court's
247. Id. at 1357.
248. Id. at 1357-58.
249. 502 U.S. 251,258 (1992) (stating that "Yakima County persuaded the Court of Appeals,
and urges upon us, that express authority for taxation of fee-patented land is found in § 6 of the
General Allotment Act, as amended. We have little doubt about the accuracy of that threshold
assessment" (footnotes omitted)).
250. Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1357-58.
251. Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
252. See Yakima, 502 U.S. at 258.
253. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
254. Id. at 375.
255. Id at 377.
256. 203 U.S. 146, 149 (1906).
257. 197 U.S. 488 (1905).
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decision in Heft, enacted the Burke Act to reverse the result in the case. If
Goudy relied on Heff and if Heff relied on the erroneous judicial assumption
that with citizenship came taxation, then it would be foolish to say that Goudy
in any way remained binding precedent. By elevating Goudy to this status, the
Ninth Circuit essentially repealed protections Congress put in place when it
enacted the Burke Act.
Third, Goudy is distinguishable because the taxpayer involved was an
individual Indian. In Lummi, the landowner was the tribe. This distinguishing
fact also escaped the notice of the Supreme Court in Yakima and is one of the
reasons why the decision is incorrect. The political status of the land owner was
an important fact to the Court in Goudy. The Court noted that the Indian
involved had severed his relationship with his tribe?' Such an emphasis on
political status is in keeping with the general intent of the allotment process,
which was the destruction of tribes and the assimilation of Indians.
Finally, the Supreme Court that decided Goudy did so when federal policy
towards Indians was overtly hostile to tribes. In his annual report for 1905,
Indian Commissioner Francis Leupp praised the destruction of reservations:
Thanks to the late Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, we
have for eighteen years been individualizing the Indian as owner of
real estate by breaking up, one at a time, the reservations set apart
for whole tribes and establishing each Indian as a separate
landholder on his own account.'
The allotment process included destruction of the relationship between members
and their tribes, something Commissioner Leupp saw as appropriate.
Some one has styled this a policy of shrinkage, because every
Indian whose name is stricken from a tribal roll by virtue of his
emancipation reduces the dimension of our red-race problem by a
fraction - very small, it may be, but not negligible. If we can thus
gradually watch our body of dependent Indians shrink, even by one
member at a time, we may congratulate ourselves that the final
solution is indeed only a question of a few years.
By 1934 federal policy changed dramatically. Indian Commissioner John Collier
explained.
The allotment system with its train of evil consequences was
definitely abandoned as the backbone of national Indian policy
when Congress adopted the Wheeler-Howard bill. The first section
258. See 1906 COMMISSIONER'S REPORT, supra note 93, at 27-31.
259. 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
260. 1905 COmmissioNER's REPORT, supra note 92, at 4.
261. Id. at 5.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
88 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
of this act in effect repeals the General Allotment Act of 1887.
During numerous committee hearings, during several redrafts and
modifications affecting every other part of the measure, this first
section was never questioned or revised. It reached the President's
desk in its original form without the change of a word or a comma,
indicating that Congress was thoroughly convinced of the allotment
system's complete failure and was eager to abandon it as the
governing policy.m
Given the dramatic change in federal policy, it is inappropriate to take a
decision from a period whose views now seem especially and clearly wrong.
To follow Goudy, given this context, helps to resurrect the dead hand of the
allotment period from its 1934 grave.
After determining that alienability was the dispositive factor in deciding the
state power to tax the tribal fee lands, the Ninth Circuit looked at the actual
alienability of the land.a The tribe argued that a federal statute (25 U.S.C. §
177) prohibiting land transfers by tribes made the land inalienable. Congress
had passed the statute in 1790.' According to the Ninth Circuit, Congress
originally enacted the section 177 land transfer restrictions upon the
recommendation of President Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox
who wanted to protect the Indians from the greed of other races.' In reality,
the lncd restrictions helped protect the wealth of Washingtonn and Knox,2"
both of whom were owners of large tracts of western lands. If the Indian lands
came onto the market, the increased supply would drive down the price of the
lands that they owned. This land sale provision gave the federal government an
actual monopoly in dealing with tribes for acquisition of lands. The monopoly
later enabled the federal government to acquire tribal lands at a nominal cost
and to sell them at a handsome profit.' The tribes, because they could sell
262. 1934 SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 202, at 78-79.




267. BEARD, ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 144. The author noted that
George Washington
was probably the richest man in the United States in his time, and his financial
ability was not surpassed among his countrymen anywhere. He possessed, in
addition to his great estate on the Potomac, a large amount of fluid capital which
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a large appreciation with the establishment of stable government and the advance
of the frontier.
Id.
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to only one buyer and one with a superior bargaining position, never received
fair value for their lands.
The Ninth Circuit refused to construe the land restriction statute as applying
to the Lummi tribal lands.m By its terms, the statute clearly applies.!" The
Ninth Circuit concluded that section 177 did not apply because no cases said
that it did not apply.m Such judicial reasoning is rather remarkable.
According to the court, a statute that is clear on its face has no operative effect
because no cases have confirmed the obvious. If the court thought that section
177 was unclear, then it should have applied the canon of construction that
applies in Indian law cases: statutes are interpreted in favor of the tribe!' In
interpreting section 177, the court did cite two cases that it read as saying that
tribally owned fee land is not subject to the restrictions in section 17724 One
case 5 involved land owned by a terminated tribe and the other 6 involved
land owned by an individual allottee. By its terms, section 177 applies only to
land transactions with tribes.
In general, then, the decision in the Lummi case is especially misguided. It
misinterpreted Yakima, relied on invalid precedent, and refused to apply the
literal language of a statute.
2. Southern Ute Tribe v. Board of County Commissioners"
In this federal district court case from Colorado, the court decided whether
the state could impose its real property tax on fee lands that the Southern Ute
Tribe owned and that were located within the tribe's reservation.2 In this
case, the tribe acquired fee lands'm that originally had been allotted under an
1880 statutetm The state argued that the underlying legislation was irrelevant
because alienability, as decided in the Lummi case, was the deciding factor."'
PAYSON J. TREAT, THE NATIONAL LAND SYsTEM: 1785-1820, at 136-39 (1910) (noting public
land sales at prices ranging from $1.00 to $1.50 per acre).
270. Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1359.
271. The statute states: "No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any
title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law
or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution." 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994).
272. Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1359.
273. Instead, the court claimed to construe the statute consistent with the original legislation;
protection of Indians from unscrupulous land speculators who would pay prices that were too low.
Id.
274. Ld.
275. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498, 505-06 (1986).
276. Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 276 U.S. 431, 433-34 (1928).
277. 855 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Colo. 1994), rev'd, 61 F.3d 916 (10th Cir. 1995) (on ripeness
grounds).
278. ld. at 1195.
279. Id. at 1196.
280. Id. at 1200.
281. Id. at 1197.
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The court rejected the "alienability" approach in the Lummi case and decided
instead that a specific federal statute had to authorize state taxation of the
lands.' Mere removal of restraints on alienation did not expose the lands to
state taxation m The court undertook a detailed analysis of the statute and
found that all of the conditions to remove restrictions had not been satisfiedu
As a result, the lands were not subject to the state property tax. The court
stated that the general rule exempting tribal lands from state taxation applied to
the Ute tribal lands because Congress had not expressly authorized the
taxation.'
In reaching its decision, the court in the Southern Ute case did not discuss
whether the ownership of the land by the tribe made any difference. The court
could have reasoned that none of the federal allotment statutes, when they
discuss taxation, specifically address tribal ownership. Under this line of
reasoning, the state could tax tribal lands only if a federal statute specifically
allowed taxation of the tribe. The allotment statutes and the treaties with
allotment provisions were silent about tribal ownership of allotted lands because
the federal government expected tribes to go out of existence and, therefore, did
not have to provide for something that it thought would be a future
impossibility.
3. United States v. Michigan
In this Sixth Circuit case, Michigan attempted to impose its ad valorem real
property tax on fee lands owned by the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe and located
within the tribe's reservation.' The lands had been allotted under an 1864
treatyY The treaty provided that the lands conveyed to individual Indians
would be freely alienable.' The lands that the tribe held had passed through
non-Indian ownership.!' When reacquired by the tribe, the county continued
assessment and collection of the property taxes.!' The United States, which
represented the tribal interests, asserted that because the lands allotted here came
under a treaty that did not expressly authorize state taxation, as had been the
case in the General Allotment Act, the state was without authority to tax the
lands. 3 The court specifically rejected the holding and alienability reasoning
282. Id. at 1200.
283. 1d.
284. Id. at 1200-02.
285. Id. at 1202.
286. Id.
287. 106 F.3d 130 (6th Cir. 1997).
288 id. at 131.
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in the Lummi case' Specifically, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Ninth
Circuit had misread Yakima and had erroneously relied on Goudy.
Michigan also asserted that Pennock v. CommissionerT was controlling.'
In Pennock, the Supreme Court had permitted Congress to impose its real
property tax on fee land owned by a Sac and Fox Indian who had remained
behind in Kansas after the federal government had moved her tribe to
Oklahoma."3 The Sixth Circuit read Pennock as holding only that a state can
tax an Indian's land if it is located outside of Indian country.'
The Sixth Circuit case also addressed the taxability of member-owned fee
lands located within the reservation." The court treated the member-owned
and tribally owned lands in the same way. Therefore, the court's holding that
Michigan could not tax the tribal lands also extended to the member-owned
lands. On this point, the court's decision is somewhat inconsistent with
Goudy.0 In Goudy, the Indian owner had severed his ties with his tribe.'
Here, the land owners were tribal members." The court did not mention
this distinction between the two cases.
Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for further litigation on
whether the tribe actually had a reservation and whether the tribe had been
dissolved." Such an inquiry is relevant because the tax immunity of the
tribe exists only so long as the tribe has a political existence. In addition,
immunity from state taxation applies only where there is Indian country's
or specific federal preemption."
4. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass CountVy
The United States Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari in this
Eighth Circuit case."0 This case involved fee lands that the tribe owned and
that were located within the tribe's reservation. The lands involved in the
294. I. at 134.
295. Id.
296. 103 U.S. 44 (1880).
297. United States v. Michigan, 106 F.3d at 134.
298. Pennock, 103 U.S. at 48.
299. United States v. Michigan, 106 F.3d at 134.
300. Id. at 131.
301. Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
302. Id. at 146.
303. United States v. Michigan, 106 F.3d at 131.
304. Id. at 135.
305. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450. n. 2 (1995).
306. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993)
(extending immunity from state taxation to lands held in trust even if located outside of a formal
reservation).
307. 108 F.3 820 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 361 (1997).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 821.
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litigation had been transferred out of tribal ownership by operation of the
Nelson Act."' That Act provided for an allotment process, for disposition
of timbered lands, and for homesteading by white settlers."' The land
subject to the allotment process ended up being governed by the General
Allotment Act as amended by the Burke Act."'
In determining the authority of the state to tax the lands, the court rejected
the alienability argument that the state made based on Lummi."3 In rejecting
the holding in Lummi, the Eighth Circuit astutely pointed out that alienability
could not be the basis for state taxation given the Supreme Court's conclusion
in Yakima that the state excise tax was impermissible?" In Yakima, the
Court invalidated the application of the state excise tax because the language
in the Burke Act authorized taxation only of the land. t5 Had alienability
been the sole factor for determining taxability, as the Ninth Circuit had held
in Lummi, then the excise tax would have been permissible."6
Instead of following Lummi, the Eighth Circuit followed the approach taken
in United States v. Michigan and in Southern Ute Tribe v. Board of County
Commissioners."7 Under that approach, the court looked for specific
statutory language authorizing state taxation. The Burke Act was the only
statute that the court found that addressed the taxation question."' That
statute applied only to the allotted lands. The Nelson Act governed the
disposition of the other lands and by its terms did not authorize state
taxation.3 9 As a result, the only lands subject to state taxation were the
lands allotted under the Nelson Act and governed by the General Allotment
Act as amended by the Burke Act?'
The tribe argued that all of its lands should be exempt from state taxation
on the theory that its ownership as a tribe entitled it to immunity. 2 The
court rejected this argument because the Supreme Court in Yakima had
specifically ruled that the General Allotment Act as amended by the Burke
Act authorized state taxation of fee lands that the Yakima Tribe owned.
The tribe's argument in Leech Lake, however, illustrates the major weakness
of the Yakima decision, which is that the General Allotment Act does not
310. Id. at 822.
311. Nelson Act of 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642.
312. Id. § 3.
313. Leech Lake, 108 F.3d at 825.
314. Id. at 825-26.
315. Yakima, 502 U.S. at 268.
316. Lummi Indian Tribe, 108 F.3d at 826.
317. Id. at 827.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 829.
320. Id.
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specifically address taxation of tribes. Perhaps this case will give the Supreme
Court the opportunity to correct the mistake it made in Yakima.
IV. Reassessing Yakima
Yakima and the lower court cases that have followed it all involved tribes
whose land base eroded substantially because of the allotment process. Had
the allotment process been the "final solution" to the "Indian problem," as
Congress intended, questions of state taxation would not arise. Tribes would
no longer exist to own land, and individual Native Americans would have no
special political status. They would all be assimilated.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, although intended to end the
allotment policy and to reverse its negative effects, actually ended up
preserving many of its negative consequences by freezing land status on
reservations. Now the maze of land ownership, something that affects all
aspects of tribal, federal, and state law as applied within Indian country,
makes state land taxation a nightmare. Of the decided cases, only Lummi
presents an approach that is administrable. Lummi permits state taxation if and
when the land involved is freely transferable - a determination that should
be relatively easy to make with current information. Sadly, Lummi is
inconsistent with the judicial and statutory law governing the area. In
addition, the case is entirely contrary to the existing federal policy which
favors tribal sovereignty and self-determination.
The three lower court cases that have applied an express exemption
requirement are consistent with Yakima, but they create a legal environment
in which the state taxing authorities will be unable to administer their property
taxes. Under these cases, property taxation cannot take place until the title
history of the land and legal research into the relevant treaties and federal
statutes is completed. If experience is any teacher, this factual and legal
research is likely to produce more uncertainty and lead to further and costly
litigation. Both the Sixth and Eighth Circuit cases, for example, were
remanded for further factual and legal proceedings.
The difficulties that the Yakima case has created is ample evidence that the
Supreme Court decided that case incorrectly. A critical mistake that the Court
made was equating members with tribes. The Burke Act authorization of state
taxation applied only to individual members. Neither the language nor the
context of the statute suggested that the authorization of state taxation should
extend to tribes. Absent an unmistakably clear authorization from Congress
to tax a tribe's ownership of land within its reservation, state taxes should
remain invalid. None of the allotment statutes or allotment treaties expressly,
explicitly, unmistakably, or unequivocally dealt with the state taxation of
tribally owned fee lands located within reservations. Finding no congressional
authorization of state taxation of tribally owned fee lands located within
reservations comports with the language of statutes and treaties, and is
consistent with federal Indian law principles.
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Unfortunately, this conclusion extends tax immunity only to tribes but not
to their members. Individual members still face the potential of taxation.
Under the Leech Lake approach, a legal and factual investigation of member-
owned fee lands within reservations is still necessary.
The tribe had argued in Yakima that the Indian Reorganization Act
effectively repealed the Burke Act language authorizing state taxation. The
Court hastily rejected this argument and concluded that it would not repeal an
existing statute unless the intent to repeal was explicit. Given the see-saw
nature of federal policy and the inevitable inconsistency between statutes that
embody policy reversals, the final tax status of tribally owned and member-
owned fee lands is not entirely clear. Given this statutory ambiguity, it is
appropriate for the Supreme Court to apply the statutory cannon of
construction that ambiguous statutes are interpreted in favor of the tribe or the
individual Native American. Under this approach, states, if they are unhappy
with the result, are free to go to Congress for a statutory remedy. Such a
result is hardly unfair. State and local governments have adequate
representation in Congress and can easily seek statutory change. Tribes, on
the other hand, have only that access to Congress that other interest groups
have. They must hire lobbyists, make campaign contributions, and work on
remedial legislation. Tribes have already expended much of their limited
resources on litigating the state taxation question. And clear answers to many
questions remain decades away unless the Supreme Court adopts the Lummi
approach and throws the problem to Congress.
Obviously, adoption of the Lummi approach, merely because it would be
administrable for state taxing authorities and remove the need for tribes to
continue further litigation, is no reason for the Supreme Court to follow
Lummi. The holding in Lummi is contrary to accepted federal Indian law
principles involving taxation and statutory construction. By following Lummi,
the Supreme Court would be providing states with a tax base windfall merely
because Congress has historically followed erratic policies that have
engendered statutory confusion.
Instead, the Supreme Court should recognize that Congress, when it passed
the General Allotment Act and the Burke Act, did not in any way authorize
state taxation of tribal lands located within a tribe's reservation boundaries.
Congressional authorization of state taxation of tribal lands in such a context
would have been inconsistent with Congress' unwavering insistence that states,
at least those admitted to the union after 1860, disclaim all power to tax tribal
lands.3"
Finding no congressional authorization - an approach that comports with
existing federal Indian law principles and with existing federal ftatutes -
would also provide an easily administrable approach for tribally owned lands
323. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 29, 1861, ch. 20, 12 Stat. 126, 127 (requiring Kansas to disclaim
authority over Indian lands). This prohibition barred state taxation of Indian lands.
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located within Indian country. All tribally owned land located within Indian
country would be exempt from state property taxation so long as Congress did
not enact new legislation that authorized the taxation. Confusion would still
remain for member-owned land, unless the Court took the Lummi "aliena-
bility" approach. The "alienability" approach, however, is legally indefensible
as illustrated in the above discussion involving the Lummi decision.
Therefore, the case-by-case approach of the other cases is the only correct
approach.
Conclusion
Viewed from a distance, a state's right to tax tribally owned land located
within an Indian tribe's political boundaries seems easy to resolve: a state has
no such power absent an explicit and unequivocal grant from Congress. No
federal legislation grants states the power to tax a tribe's ownership of its land
within its boundaries. End of discussion. States, however, have taken the
maze of treaties and federal legislation and have argued that Congress
intended to authorize state taxation. The Supreme Court in Yakima has
naively assumed that from this maze-like morass clear congressional intent
emerges. Given the actual lack of clear congressional expression, who should
be the beneficiaries of the confusion? States or tribes? The law says the
tribes.
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